A private, offline vault for notes, passwords and codes.
Everything is encrypted on your own device. No accounts, no cloud, and the app
does not request internet access — so it cannot send anything anywhere. The
only way anything leaves is a backup file you export yourself, encrypted with
a password only you know.
What it does
Stores notes, passwords, and codes, encrypted with AES-256.
The key is derived from your master password using Argon2id; the password is never stored.
Fingerprint and master password — both, every time, never one
instead of the other. On by default.
Optionally, the key itself can be held in your phone's security chip, so
the fingerprint check cannot be skipped even by a modified copy of the
app. Off until you turn it on.
Locks itself the moment you switch away, and wipes the key from memory.
Two deliberate exceptions: the fingerprint prompt and the file picker are
Android screens SenseVault itself opened, so it stays unlocked behind
them — otherwise you could never finish unlocking, or restore a backup.
Blocks screenshots and hides the app in the recent-apps list. Copied
secrets are wiped from the clipboard after 30 seconds, when the vault
locks, and on the next launch if the app was closed before either.
Encrypted backups you control — the only copy is the one you keep.
Moving to a new phone
There is no sync — which is the same reason nothing can move
without you. On the old phone, create an encrypted backup and put the file
somewhere the new phone can reach: cloud storage, an email to yourself, a USB
stick. On the new phone, install SenseVault, create a vault, and restore from
that file. Do it before you part with the old phone; a backup made after it is
wiped does not exist.
The security-chip setting does not trap your vault on one
device. A backup file is encrypted on its own and does not depend on any chip,
so it restores anywhere.
Honest limits
If you forget your master password, or lose the phone without a backup,
your data cannot be recovered by anyone — including us. That is a consequence of the
encryption, not a policy. No app can protect data on a device that is itself rooted,
infected, or unlocked in someone else's hands.
